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Abstract 
Since the inception of Pro-Fac Cooperative (PF) in 1960, the cooperative has undergone 
significant structural and organizational changes.   The PF case presents a unique opportunity to 
examine the changes in the processed fruit and vegetable industry and the strategies adopted by a 
producer-owned cooperative to best represent member interests in the face of the industry 
structural changes over the past fifty years.   
PF is an agricultural cooperative that markets crops primarily grown by its member-
growers, including fruits (cherries, apples, blueberries, and peaches), vegetables (snap beans, 
beets, peas, sweet corn, carrots, cabbage, squash, asparagus and potatoes), and popcorn.  
Members are located principally in the states of New York, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Michigan, 
Washington, Oregon, Iowa, Nebraska, Florida, and Illinois.   PF‟s history can be generally 
broken down into three distinct time periods, each representing a significant phase of 
restructuring.  Particular attention is given to the decision to enter into the most recent and 
current phase of operations.  
Adequate financing of operations and value-added enterprises were dominant foci over 
all three periods and each phase involved a different approach.  A variety of strategies were also 
used to enhance the market security for products produced by members. Initially, PF was formed 
to help preserve the fruit and vegetable processing industry in New York State.  At that time, 
owning the processing facilities was a logical strategy.   
The development of alternative cooperative structures is often pursued to ameliorate 
financial constraints, while attempting to maintain member control.  The evolution and 
restructuring of the PF cooperative can also be described using an ownership control rights 
typology framework (Chaddad and Cook 2004).  Drawing from the property rights and 
incomplete contracts theories of the firm, Chaddad and Cook argue that alternative cooperative 
models differ in how ownership rights are defined and assigned to the agents of the firm, i.e., 
members, patrons, managers, and investors.  In the current phase, investors acquired ownership 
rights in a separate legal entity that is partly owned by the cooperative, i.e. a cooperative with 
capital seeking entities (Chaddad and Cook 2004). 
As time progressed and economic conditions changed, PF members were not able to 
adequately capitalize value-added operations.  An arrangement was struck with a private equity 
firm to provide a needed infusion of capital.  The case examines to decision made by the board 
of directors to enter into this agreement.  PF has increased its capacity to serve as a preferred 
supplier to those firms that can afford owning and operating plants while divesting its majority, 
ownership position in processing assets.   
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Serving Member Interests in Changing Markets:  The Case of Pro-Fac Cooperative 
Background 
Since the inception of Pro-Fac Cooperative (PF) in 1960, the cooperative has 
undergone significant structural and organizational changes.   The PF case presents a 
unique opportunity to examine the changes in the processed fruit and vegetable industry 
and the strategies adopted by a producer-owned cooperative to best represent member 
interests in the face of the industry structural changes over the past fifty years.   
PF is an agricultural cooperative that markets crops primarily grown by its 
member-growers, including fruits (cherries, apples, blueberries, and peaches), vegetables 
(snap beans, beets, peas, sweet corn, carrots, cabbage, squash, asparagus and potatoes), 
and popcorn. As of June 30, 2008, there were approximately 486 PF members, located 
principally in the states of New York, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Washington, 
Oregon, Iowa, Nebraska, Florida, and Illinois. Only growers of crops marketed through 
PF (or associations of such growers) can become members of PF.  
Each producer approved for membership must purchase common stock in 
proportion to expected patronage that carries voting rights, and enter into a marketing 
agreement with the cooperative.  Commodity committees represent the interests of 
members for each of the major crops marketed, and work jointly with PF customers in 
determining the Commercial Market Value (CMV) for each crop marketed.  CMV 
represents the price that other processors would pay for raw product of similar quality 
and use.  CMV is an industry-weighted average value for each commodity, with 
adjustments based on grading, compensation of services, and other differences in costs.  
To provide a fair and equitable distribution of net proceeds, members participate in a 
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single, multi-commodity payment pool which combines expenses and revenues generated 
during each fiscal year.  Members‟ shares of patronage proceeds above CMV are 
distributed based on a pro-rata share of total production for each commodity. 
The portion of after-tax net income from non-PF member business is assigned to 
equity as unallocated, tax-paid retained earnings. The non-cash portion of PF earnings 
generated through member patronage is generally allocated to each member‟s account as 
retained earnings (retains). Capital retained from earnings was converted to Class A 
preferred stock after each series of retains has been outstanding for five years. PF‟s Class 
A cumulative preferred stock is currently listed as “PFACP” on the NASDAQ market. 
 History  
For ease of exposition, PF‟s history can be generally broken down into three 
distinct time periods, each representing a significant phase of restructuring.  Particular 
attention will be focused on the decision to enter into the most recent and current phase of 
operations.  
Phase One – Formation & Integrated Agreement 
The Cooperative was founded in 1960 in western New York State.  The post-
WWII period resulted in significant changes in the food processing industry as well as in 
the status of farmer-owned fruit and vegetable marketing cooperatives.  Many small, 
family-owned and farmer-owned processors that relied on government contracts during 
the war years lost a key market.  In addition, there were major developments in food 
processing and packaging technologies that required large investments in plants and 
equipment to stay competitive.   
 3 
During this period the number of fruit and vegetable processing and marketing 
cooperatives saw a major decline, as cooperatives consolidated or went out of business 
and the number of producers declined.  The number of fruit and vegetable marketing 
cooperatives in the U.S. declined from 825 in 1951 to 438 in 1971; by the end of 1994 
less than 300 cooperatives remained (USDA 2008).  However, real gross sales (deflated 
by the U.S. Producer Price Index for processed food commodities) continued to increase, 
reaching $8.4 billion by the end of this time period.  
The Cooperative Grange League Federation (GLF), which later became Agway, 
was the dominant supply and input cooperative operating in the Northeastern U.S. in 
1960.  GLF members in western New York expressed concern over the potential loss of 
several family-owned processing firms coming up for sale.  GLF acted as a catalyst to 
effect the merger of two family-owned canning businesses, Curtice Bros. and Burns-
Alton, to form Curtice Burns, Inc. (CB).  Concurrently, GLF helped to form and initially 
capitalize PF.  The name “Pro-Fac” is a contraction of the two words – “producers” and 
“facilities”.   
As part of the arrangements, PF purchased the plant facilities of the two 
processing companies and leased them back CB.  GLF/Agway assisted in creating, 
financing, and managing the integrated agreement between CB and PF.  Many initial PF 
members were also members of the GLF/Agway cooperative. Two interlocking boards of 
directors were established to govern each of the integrated agreement partners, with 
GLF/Agway maintaining controlling interest in CB.  CB became a publicly traded 
company in 1973 when its common stock was listed on the American Stock Exchange.   
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The integrated agreement spelled out the role and responsibilities of each entity in 
the areas of finance, management, marketing, and supply of member crops (Table 1). The 
founders were very careful in constructing the agreement to avoid some of the major 
pitfalls that they observed in previously failed marketing cooperatives. The founders of 
PF deliberated over the terms of the agreement to improve the chances of success as 
described by the first PF manager and President of CB: 
“The history of fruit and vegetable marketing cooperatives is littered with failures and very 
few successes. The originators of Curtice-Burns and Pro-Fac studied these histories. They 
became convinced that there were several basic needs which had to be provided. They 
include management of the cooperatives by experienced professionals who are kept at 
arms-length in daily operation, product diversification, financing the total operation 
through commercial as well as the Bank for Cooperatives borrowing, and the opportunity 
for public investment through trading on one of the stock exchanges. CB and PF have 
remained successful by emphasizing the policy that they limit their activities to the 
marketing of products that are profitable to both companies.” 
- Morton Adams, PF‟s first General Manager, as well as president of CB until he 
retired in 1975 (PF Annual Report, 1986). 
 
Many elements of the agreement created new organizational innovations that were 
not typically used by traditional, farmer-owned cooperatives at this time and were more 
aligned with so-called “new generation cooperative” elements. In contrast to “open” 
membership and deliveries, clearly defined equity and delivery requirements were 
established, including up-front equity in proportion to the volume of crops delivered. The 
management of marketing functions was separated from the overall management of the 
cooperative, while assuring annual crop production plans fit with the marketing plans for 
the associated products.  With a variety of commodities and a heterogeneous 
membership, a single, multi-commodity pool for member payments was established.  
Non-member directors served on the board of directors and capital was generated from 
public markets via the CB common stock listing on the ASE. 
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In general, the integrated arrangement that was in place during this period 
provided an organizational foundation for generating a number of economic benefits for 
members including: increased market security, enhanced prices for member crops, a 
financially strong value-added business, and relatively good returns on member equity.  
The integrated operations also provided valuable information and market data to Pro-Fac 
members.  Sales and market intelligence passed through from CB were used by PF for 
crop production planning.  Related information on processing industry trends and 
inventories proved valuable to PF members in determining crop selection and planting 
plans.    
PF was responsible for providing agricultural services to members, coordinating 
planting and harvesting as well as crop delivery while CB was responsible for food 
manufacturing, sales and marketing as well as consumer product distribution.   
The number of fruit and vegetable commodities as well as snack and food 
products increased considerably during this phase. PF membership expanded 
geographically in alignment with CB‟s aggressive growth and diversification strategy. PF 
membership grew from 368 in 1974 to its high of 819 in 1982.  The aggressive growth 
was reflected in strong increases in real CMV from the 1960s to the mid-1980s exceeding 
US$63 million (in 2006 dollars) by 1986, and over US$80 million by the end of 1994 
(Figure 1).  While increased productivity and technological advancements on farms 
contributed to softening membership by the end of Phase One to 625 members, as the 
average CMV received and deliveries per member continued to increase. 
 The aggressive growth through acquisitions by CB is also evident in Pro-Fac‟s 
combined operations balance sheet data (Table 2).  During this phase, the combined 
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operations showed significant growth in assets, increasing from nearly US$400 million in 
1983 to over US$950 million by 1990 (evaluated at nominal levels). However, subpar 
financial performance prompted the sale of poorly performing operations, and by the end 
of 1994, total assets were reduced to US$819 million. 
Phase Two – End of Joint Venture and Additional Acquisitions 
During the late 1980‟s and early 1990‟s Agway experienced poor financial 
performance culminating in two years of net losses in 1990 and 1991 (Anderson and 
Henehan 2002).  Under a new CEO in 1992, the company began a major reorganization, 
including a renewed focus on Agway‟s core businesses and divesting non-core 
businesses.  In 1994, Agway announced the potential sale of Curtice Burns Foods, CBF 
(renamed in 1987), and after a long, protracted, and expensive change of control, PF 
acquired CBF from Agway in September of that year.  The transaction was historic in the 
sense that PF became the first farmer cooperative to acquire a publicly traded company 
and take it private.  In 1997, CBF changed its name to Agrilink Foods (AF) and by March 
of 2000 PF effectively began doing business as AF, creating an overall holding company 
for the processing and marketing assets.  The new name signified PF‟s role in linking the 
agricultural and marketing segments of the business. 
While AF was a wholly-owned subsidiary of PF, each entity retained its own 
board of directors with AF‟s board being appointed by the PF board.  The boards met 
jointly and coordinated activities.  Business structures and operations were centralized 
and streamlined to reduce costs and inefficiencies.  The acquisition allowed PF to become 
the first farmer cooperative with securities listed on a major stock exchange when it‟s 
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Class A cumulative preferred stock was listed on the NASDAQ in 1995 to provide 
increased liquidity for member equity.  
Similar to the previous agreement, PF supplied crops and additional financing to 
AF; in return, AF provided a market (CMV of products supplied) and management 
services to PF. PF shared in the profits and losses of AF, and reinvested at least 70% of 
any additional patronage income back into AF.  
Acquisitions and joint ventures with smaller companies and regional brands 
continued to grow during this phase. PF‟s most significant move came in 1998 when AF 
acquired Dean Foods‟ frozen and canned vegetable business for US$400 million, along 
with its Birds Eye, Freshlike, and Veg-All national brands.  The Dean Foods acquisition 
effectively doubled the branded operations proportion of the business, a decision that was 
consistent with AF‟s strategic direction at the time, according to Dennis M. Mullen, AF 
president and CEO:  
“Our strategic plan has called for growth, and, with this transaction, we are taking a 
significant step forward in growing our cooperative which also expands sourcing 
opportunities for our Pro-Fac owners.  … Together with our own strong workforce, we 
will collectively enhance our overall position as a leader in food processing.  The addition 
of Dean’s branded products to our portfolio is consistent with our strategy to balance our 
private label business with our own strong brands.  This balance is critical to our success 
as an agriculturally-driven business.”  (QFFI, 1998) 
 
In addition to increased debt, acquiring a large, national brand brought intense 
competition from related brands (e.g., Del Monte, PepsiCo., Nabisco), and required a 
significant investment in research and development to continue to introduce new and 
innovative products (Amanor-Boadu, et al. 2003).    
With the acquisition of CB and the formation of Agrilink Foods (AF), PF was 
now the owner and operator of processing facilities as well as responsible for marketing.  
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Through it‟s subsidiary AF, PF became responsible for providing agricultural services to 
members, coordinating planting and harvesting, crop delivery, food manufacturing, sales 
and marketing, as well as consumer product distribution.   
After decreases in real CMV in 1995 and 1996, total CMV (inflation adjusted) 
increased later in Phase Two (see Figure 1).  This period saw continued decline in total 
members as farm numbers dropped but per member deliveries increased.  Due to CB‟s 
higher leveraged position, the acquisition increased PF‟s debt position and level of 
member equity capitalization significantly. In 1993, prior to the acquisition, PF‟s member 
equity level was approximately 34 percent of assets; by 1996 this figure dropped to under 
20 percent (Table 2).  In order to provide increased liquidity for member equity, preferred 
stock was listed on the NASDAQ market in1995. 
Returns, on average, were relatively good, but more variable.  However, 
substantial draws from earned surplus were required in 1996, 2001, and 2002 to offset 
negative earnings and maintain dividend payments.  
Moreover, the acquisition of a large, national branded company increased PF‟s 
leveraged position tremendously resulting in a debt ratio of nearly 100% and a reported 
equity percentage of less than three percent by 2002 (Table 2).  The reduced equity 
position was also a result of a non-cash, goodwill impairment charge of US$179 million 
(US$137.5 million net of taxes) charged as negative income for fiscal year 2002. As 
discussed in Amanor-Boadu, et al. (2003), this charge was due to a number of factors 
including:  worsening general economic conditions in the industry, reduced asset 
valuations from market declines, and the valuation reached in the agreement with Vestar 
in 2002.  
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It was during this phase that internal sources of equity capital reached their limit, 
with average per member capitalization in excess of US$250,000, a nearly 50% increase 
over a six year time horizon and tighter profit margins.  The higher debt load grew 
problematic and strategic efforts to minimize debt became a priority.   
Phase Three – Outside Equity Infusion and Restructured Operations 
The increased debt servicing requirements and need for increased capital 
investment grew beyond the means of the membership – outside equity investment was 
required to ameliorate these financial constraints.  Following a detailed review of all the 
strategic options, the PF board of directors arrived at the decision, and members 
approved, to enter into an agreement with Vestar, LLC (Vestar) a private equity firm.  
In August, 2002, when an outside equity infusion by majority investor Vestar was 
secured, Agrilink Holdings (AH) was created.  PF contributed all shares of its AF 
common stock (valued at approximately US$32 million) for Class B common units of 
AH and representing 40.72% of the common equity ownership. Vestar contributed a total 
of  US$175 million in cash.  Of that total, US$137.5 million was invested in a preferred 
stock instrument while US$35.5 million was invested in Class A common units and 
representing 56.24% of common equity ownership.  Selected management of PF and AF 
acquired US$1.3 million of Class C and D common units, or the remaining 3.04% of 
common equity interest.  In 2003, AF and AH changed names to Birds Eye Foods (BEF) 
and Birds Eye Holdings (BEH), respectively.  
As specified in an agreement with Vestar, PF received annual payments of US$10 
million for five years, and could utilize a US$1 million line of credit for each of the five 
years.  Furthermore, an amended marketing and facilitation agreement was created 
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identifying PF as the preferred supplier of crops under a 10-year supply agreement.  BEF 
would continue to pay CMV for all crops supplied by PF.   BEF would continue to 
provide PF members services related to planning, consulting, sourcing, and harvesting 
crops.  With an eye towards reducing debt and improving member equity position, the 
Vestar transaction was consistent with the financing needs of the cooperative, as 
explained by Dennis Mullen, AF president and CEO: 
“De-leveraging our balance sheet with these investment proceeds will strengthen the 
company’s position in the highly competitive food industry.” (RFF, 2002) 
 
Vestar restructured the BEF business by trimming payroll expenses, changing the 
management team, and selling off selected brands and assets. In 2006, BEF elected to 
concentrate its resources on its branded business and increase its focus on new products 
and marketing. As a result, BEF put its non-branded frozen facilities up for sale, 
including plants in NY, GA, and WI.  PF was no longer interested in owning the 
processing side of its operations, as indicated by then Board President Peter Call.   
“Any opportunity must be economically beneficial to growers and consider the well-being 
of the communities where these facilities are located.  Pro-Fac’s expertise lies in 
producing raw products, not in operating processing facilities, so a partnership between 
the Cooperative and an operating entity is an option that will actively be pursued.” (Pro-
Fac press release, July 25, 2006) 
 
In November 2006, Allen Canning Company (now Allens, Inc.) acquired 
substantially all of the operating assets of BEF‟s non-branded frozen vegetable business, 
including the five plants in NY, GA, and WI.  As part of the transaction, BEF assigned to 
Allens the portion of the supply arrangements under the marketing and facilitation 
agreement with PF.  While PF continues to sell products to BEF, primarily fruit products, 
its private label business and non-branded vegetable business were transferred to Allens.   
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Conceptual Framework 
 An accepted definition of a cooperative is “a user-owned and user controlled 
business that distributes benefits on the basis of use” (Cobia 1989).  And so, members of 
a marketing cooperative can derive economic benefits from their cooperative in various 
ways: as a supplier of raw products (prices, services), an owner of assets (return on 
equity, strategic value of assets) that are related to cooperative operations and through 
control exerted by member-based governance structures (market security, strategic 
direction).   The decision to enter into the Vestar agreement will be viewed in light of the 
potential member benefits generated from the transition for members as both suppliers 
and equity holders.  Management theory will be used to review the “pros and cons” of 
each potential strategic option open to PF and how various alternatives were evaluated by 
the board of directors.   
The development of alternative cooperative structures is often pursued to 
ameliorate financial constraints, while attempting to maintain member control.  The 
evolution and restructuring of the PF cooperative can also be described using an 
ownership control rights typology framework (Chaddad and Cook 2004).  Drawing from 
the property rights and incomplete contracts theories of the firm, Chaddad and Cook  
argue that alternative cooperative models differ in how ownership rights are defined and 
assigned to the agents of the firm, i.e., members, patrons, managers, and investors.  They 
use a broad definition of ownership rights including both residual claims (i.e., who has 
first claim to the net income) as well as control rights (i.e., who „owns‟ and controls 
assets).  
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Within this framework, the traditional cooperative and the investor-owned firm 
are identified as polar organizational forms.  They argue that the “vaguely defined” 
property rights associated with the traditional cooperative imply constraints to investment 
and governance (Chaddad and Cook 2004).  “New generation cooperatives”, structured 
similar to the original PF operational and governance features, relieve some investment 
constraints whereby delivery rights are acquired on the basis of expected patronage as 
well as the required equity capital investment. This structure within PF helped to reduce 
the free-rider problem inherent in traditional cooperative structures when property rights 
are not transferable or unassigned (Cook 1995).  Further, when ownership rights are not 
restricted to member-patrons, outside equity capital may become available to support 
increased capital requirements.  In Phase 3., investors acquired ownership rights in a 
separate legal entity that is partly owned by the cooperative, i.e. a cooperative with 
capital seeking entities (Chaddad and Cook 2004). 
The principal-agent problem within a property rights theoretic approach is also 
evident in most cooperative forms as member boards of directors (the principals) and 
management (the agent) can have differing interests.  Typically member-directors act to 
improve member returns, while management may be pursuing their own goals, such as 
compensation and bonuses (Fulton 1995).  As such, asymmetries in information arise and 
the agent‟s decisions (and motivations) are not fully observable. 
Analysis of the Decision to Restructure with Outside Equity Investment 
PF‟s debt position under the integrated agreement was relatively stable during 
1970s and 1980s; however, more aggressive expansion in the latter stages of phase one, 
resulted in increasing debt ratios from around 40 percent in the mid-1980s to over 60 
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percent by 1993 (Table 2). Total member equity investment grew considerably over this 
period, with average per member equity/capitalization growing from less than US$24,000 
in 1974 to over US$180,000 by 1992.  By 2002, PF found itself burdened with a higher 
level of debt and the associated interest expense, which limited access to needed capital.  
During this time, growers were experiencing several years of low crop prices and limited 
farm income.  PF members already had significant levels of equity invested in the 
cooperative and were not in a position to invest more.  The board of directors found it 
necessary to explore other sources of capital to maintain viable operations and address 
financial challenges.   
The options that PF management and board explored included the following six 
alternatives: increase public stock offering, seek a strategic investor, find a synergistic 
partner to enter into a LLC, secure a private equity infusion, “tough it out”, or sell the 
company (Wright 2003).  A summary of the “pros and cons” for each option is presented 
in Table 3.  The board chose to pursue a capital infusion from a private equity firm. A 
request for proposals was issued to seek responses from various equity investment firms.  
The board decided to enter into an agreement with the firm that offered the best terms 
including a supply agreement, termination payments, and support for continued payment 
of dividends payments. The board selected Vestar Capital Partners, LLC (Vestar) as their 
choice and the decision was overwhelmingly approved by a vote of PF members. 
Along with the decision to seek financing from a private equity firm, PF made 
significant changes in its operations, basically shifting from an operating and marketing 
cooperative that owned processing assets and branded products to a bargaining 
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cooperative that became a supplier to key processing firms. PF withdrew from processing 
and marketing activities to focus on crop supply coordination and delivery (Figure 4). 
While BEF and Allens are currently PF‟s two major customers, PF serves 
multiple firms, both big and small, across the country in relation to its major commodity 
production areas.  Regional agreements, such as PF‟s membership interest and agreement 
with Farm Fresh First, LLC in New York State, provide PF with agricultural, marketing, 
and administrative services for the sale of agricultural products grown by PF members 
that are not otherwise subject to supply agreements.  Farm Fresh First is also responsible 
for providing agricultural services to members, coordinating planting and harvesting, and 
crop delivery.  BEF, Allens, and other PF customers are responsible for manufacturing, 
sales and marketing, as well as consumer and food service product distribution. 
PF member numbers and the CMV received have remained relatively stable 
during this phase; the outside equity infusion has not altered members‟ ability to receive 
competitive prices for their products (Figure 1).  Strategies to invest in national brands 
also remained, but were now under the ownership control of Vestar.  Management of 
these operations, along with the processing facilities associated with them, had been 
shifted to outside parties with the available equity capital.   
Reporting and access to information from BEH, now a private company, are 
restricted.  The loss of ownership rights can limit access to information that might be 
valuable to members or was previously available in earlier phases.  In considering the 
principal-agent problem, this is particularly relevant.  Reduced information can enhance 
the principal-agent problem, particularly in this instance where an additional agent is 
involved outside of the cooperative organization and with controlling interest in 
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marketing and sales operations.  BEH‟s actions are clear in terms of enhancing returns to 
stakeholder investment.  However, it was also clear to cooperative members that 
management expertise and access to sufficient capital in the highly competitive branded 
processed fruit and vegetable market were needed even though principal-agent issues 
might arise. 
As specified in an agreement with Vestar, PF received annual payments of US$10 
million for five years, and could utilize a US$1 million line of credit for each of the five 
years.  Furthermore, an amended marketing and facilitation agreement was created 
identifying PF as the preferred supplier of crops under a 10-year supply agreement.  BEF 
would continue to pay CMV for all crops supplied by PF and would continue to provide 
PF member services related to planning, consulting, sourcing, and harvesting crops.   
Due to changes in reporting procedures and accounting methods, direct 
comparisons across phases are problematic; however, general changes from the shift in 
ownership control can be highlighted. While net income was supported by termination 
payments for a specified time, these proceeds largely supported the maintenance of 
dividends on preferred stock.  Reported balance sheet data now reflects only PF 
operations, with no reporting of (minority owned) assets, liabilities, or equity holdings 
under BEH (Table 2).  Even with considering the initial US$32 million PF investment in 
BEH, the outside equity infusion has ameliorated PF‟s debt servicing requirements and 
substantially reduced PF member equity and capitalization levels (Figure 2). 
Annual distributions from BEH to PF are made at the discretion of Vestar and 
were not expected, by PF. This is reflected in the minimal net proceeds available to 
members early in phase three. In fact, equity income losses from BEH in 2005 and 2006 
 16 
resulted in additional draws from earned surplus accounts. However, in July of 2007 
(FY2008), BEH distributed approximately $120 million to PF as an investor in BEH.  PF 
used the distribution to redeem selected shareholder equity and pay dividends on selected 
securities, in some cases retroactively.  PF used a portion of this distribution to redeem all 
retained earnings allocated to its members, repay principal and interest owed under its 
credit agreement with BEF and to redeem all of its non-cumulative preferred stock and 
64% of its Class A cumulative preferred stock.  An additional 22% of Class A cumulative 
preferred stock was redeemed on October 31, 2008 (in FY2009). 
It remains to be seen what the future holds for the strategies adopted in the latest 
phase of operations.  Typically, private equity firms hold onto firms that they have 
invested in for a limited number of years to improve profitability and earnings, and then 
sell their interest to achieve a capital gain.  When (and if) BEH is sold, PF and its 
members would receive a share of any gain from the sale proportionate to their share of 
total common equity invested in BEH at that time.  It remains difficult to project what 
return on equity to members might derive from such a sale.   
Conclusions 
There are a number of common issues that cut across each of the three phases 
discussed above.  Each phase used various strategies to attempt to address the issues for 
the benefit of members.  These issues or performance areas include: financing, market 
security, relationships with processors, management, and governance.  This case has 
looked closely at the first three evolving issues. 
Adequate financing of operations and value-added enterprises were dominant foci 
over all three periods and each phase involved a different approach.  A variety of 
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strategies were also used to enhance the market security for products produced by 
members. Initially, PF was formed to help preserve the fruit and vegetable processing 
industry in New York State.  At that time, owning the processing facilities was a logical 
strategy.  As time progressed and economic conditions changed, PF members and the 
cooperative have increased their capacity to serve as a preferred supplier to those firms 
that can afford owning and operating plants.   
The current situation for most members is positive.  Prices for most crops rose in 
2008, although the costs of inputs are increased as well.  Processors for many crops are 
increasing projected deliveries or anticipating greater volumes.  The recent US$120 
million distribution created a more viable future for PF, as well as generated a high, short 
term return on equity for individual members.  It should be noted that the situation for 
growers varies.  For example, cucumber producers in the Northwest have lost a key 
buyer.  However, most members are deriving economic benefits both as suppliers 
(relatively high prices and increased deliveries) and as investors (improving return on 
equity).  As can be the case in agricultural businesses, prosperity can unfold in cycles; it 
remains to be seen how long this period of higher prices and a relatively secure market 
will last. 
The PF story presents a unique case in the world of agricultural cooperatives 
including the first farmer cooperative to mount a leveraged buyout of a publicly-traded 
company and take it private, and the first agricultural cooperative to have a security listed 
on a major exchange.  PF has continued to adopt and redesign in a world of ever-
changing markets.  PF was an early adopter of a number of innovative strategies to 
overcome potential constraints to agricultural cooperative success including:  transferable 
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delivery rights,  a multi-commodity single earnings pool, conversion of member equity to 
publicly-traded securities, and partnering with successful marketing firms and private 
equity groups.  The next phase in PF history remains to be written, however Steve 
Wright, the current General Manager and CEO summarizes it well: 
"Pro-Fac Cooperative has produced many "firsts" in the Cooperative world and 
successfully weathered the storms of dramatic external and internally driven change. We 
firmly believe that when the final chapter is written about our Cooperative, it will reveal 
that Pro-Fac members derived great benefit from their Pro-Fac affiliation in terms of 
supply, crop valuations and returns on equity." 
Steve Wright (2008), Pro-Fac General Manager & CEO ( 1995-present) 
 
Other cooperatives struggling to finance value-added operations may benefit from 
some of the lessons learned from PF.  A cooperative may avoid conversion to an investor 
oriented firm and retain its member oriented structure through restructuring operations 
and entering into a creative relationship with a private equity firm. 
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Table 1. Summary of Curtice Burns and Pro-Fac Cooperative Integrated Agreement. 
Curtice Burns Area Pro-Fac 
-Net proceeds derived from total sales; 
shared with PF 50/50 
-Common stock listed on AMEX, 1973 
Finance 
-Financed ownership of plants, leased to 
CB 
-Equity loaned to CB; seasonal & term 
loans from Bank for Coop‟s  
-Sold delivery rights based on common 
stock to members 
-Conducted all marketing activities 
-Owned brands, made acquisitions 
-Developed new products 
Marketing 
-Recruited members from new acquisition 
farming areas 
-Reserved first right to purchase brands 
upon dissolution 
-Farm products provide basis for new 
products 
-Supervised and managed business and 
properties of PF 
-Maintained relations with lenders, 
kept books for joint venture 
-One PF director on CB board 
Management 
& Governance 
-PF and Agway had access to books and 
financial information 
-1 CB and 1 Agway director on PF board 
-Payment for crops based on CMV 
-As CB operations expanded, PF given 
first right to supply new plants 
-Developed sales plan that determined 
volume produced for each commodity 
Supply 
Agreement 
-Committee for each commodity 
-Committees determine CMV in concert 
with PF management and approve crop 
agreements 
-Payments made from a single,  multi-
commodity pool 
 
 
Table 2. Pro-Fac balance sheet data, selected fiscal years ending June 30 (nominal, million US dollars).a 
Year 
 
1983 
 
  1993 
 
1996 
 
Entity 
  
PF 
 
CB 
 
PF+CB 
  
PF 
  
CB 
  
PF+CB 
 PF 
Agrilink 
Assets  $ 137.6 $ 260.1 $ 397.6  $ 324.9  $ 493.7  $ 818.6  $ 637.3 
Liabilities  $   82.9 $ 215.4 $ 298.2  $ 215.0  $ 403.6  $ 618.6  $ 510.6 
Equity  $   54.7 $   44.7 $   99.4  $ 109.9  $   90.1  $ 200.0  $ 126.7 
% Equity  39.8% 17.2% 25.0%  33.8%  18.3%  24.4%  19.9% 
             
Year  1999  2002  2003  2005  2007  2008 
 
Entity 
 PF 
Agrilink 
 PF 
Agrilink 
  
PF 
  
PF 
  
PF 
  
PF 
Assets  $1,196.5  $ 836.2  $ 31.5  $ 23.9  $ 25.3  $ 52.4 
Liabilities  $1,044.4  $ 811.7  $ 12.1  $ 12.7  $ 20.5  $ 22.5 
Equity  $   152.1  $   24.5  $ 24.3  $ 11.2  $   4.4  $ 29.4 
% Equity  12.7%  2.9%  77.3%  47.0%  17.3%  56.1% 
Sources: Pro-Fac (PF), Curtice Burns (CB), and Agrilink Annual Reports, PF SEC 10-K filings. 
a Following 2002, balance sheet data does not include PF investment in Birds Eye Holdings, LLC (BEH), 321,429 
Class B common equity units, original value of US$32 million. 
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Figure 1. Commercial Market Value (CMV) of Raw Product Deliveries, Total and per Member, 
1962 – 2008. 
 
 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1
9
7
4
 
1
9
7
6
 
1
9
7
8
 
1
9
8
0
 
1
9
8
2
 
1
9
8
4
 
1
9
8
6
 
1
9
8
8
 
1
9
9
0
 
1
9
9
2
 
1
9
9
4
 
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
D
e
b
t 
R
a
ti
o
  
(%
)
T
o
ta
l 
L
ia
b
il
it
ie
s,
 n
o
m
in
al
, 
U
S
$
 m
il
li
o
n
Year
Figure _. Pro-Fac debt positions, measures of solvency
Total Liabilities Debt Ratio (%)
\
Sources: Pro-Fac, Curtice Burns, & Agrilink 
Annual Reports, Pro-Fac SEC 10-K Filings
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
 
Figure 2.  Pro-Fac Debt Levels and Debt Ratios, 1974 – 2008. 
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Figure 3. Pro-Fac Shareholder and Member Capitalization and Investment, 1974 - 2008. 
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Delivery    
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Products
Retail
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Service
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Coordination
& Harvest
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Brand
Products
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Marketing
Distribution
----- F a r m  P r o d u c t   V a l u e     C h a i n ----------
Member 
Farm
Member 
Farm
Pro-Fac Functions
(Minority Share of BEF)
Birds Eye Foods
Functions
(Vestar Majority  Owner of BEF)
Supply agreements 
Allen’s Foods Functions
Private Label
Products
Private
Label
Products
Sales &
Marketing
Farm Fresh First, LLC
Functions
(  
Figure 4. Current Pro-Fac Integrated Operations with National Firms and Outside Equity Partner 
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Table 3.  Pros and Cons of Various Outside Equity Options  
Outside Option Pro Con 
Public Offering Potential to raise needed capital 
 
Previously utilized public markets 
 
Diversify sources of capital 
 
 
 
Strong emphasis on short term performance 
 
Driven by quarterly earnings results 
 
Market volatility 
 
High costs of listing 
 
SEC & Sarbanes-Oxley compliance 
 
Dilute member control 
Strategic Investor 
 
 
 
 
Potential to raise needed capital 
 
Might find investor with compatible 
goals for business 
 
 
 
Limited pool of potential investors 
 
Dilute member control 
 
Could have  goals conflicting with members 
 
Synergistic Partner 
 
 
 
 
Potential to raise needed capital 
 
Might find partner in similar industry 
compatible goals for business 
 
Create synergy that brings mutual 
benefits 
 
Limited pool of potential partners 
 
Dilute member control 
 
Could have  goals conflicting with members 
 
“Tough It Out” 
 
 
 
 
Avoid brining in outside investors 
 
Maintain higher level of member control 
 
 
 
Creditors could lose patience 
 
Dim outlook for future success 
 
Could result in significant erosion of the 
value of member equity and other stock 
holders  
Private Equity Firm 
 
 
 
 
Ability to select firm of choice 
 
Identify firm with compatible goals and 
management culture 
 
Bring additional management talent into 
operations 
 
Negotiate supply agreement 
Limited pool of potential firms 
 
Dilute member control 
 
Could have  goals conflicting with members 
 
Incompatible management culture 
Sell the company Generate immediate revenues from sale 
 
Get out from under high debt load 
 
 
Low valuation of company based on current 
EBITDA and debt 
 
Uncertainty about future owner 
 
Lose any  member control 
 
 

